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In the 
Supreme Court of the State of Utah 
HARRIS BETHERS, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
VS~ 
LALIF \VOOD~ d/b/a INDUSTRIAL 
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF 
AND RESPONDENT 
ST ... ~ TEMENT OF THE CASE 
Case No. 
9062 
The plaintiff, Harris Bethers_. commenced this suit 
in the District Court to- recover the agreed price of gravel 
furnished pursuant to a \vritten contr-aet. The defendant 
counterclaimed seeking alleged damages for a purported 
delay in the furnishing of the gravel. There is no dispute 
a..s to the amount of gravel furnished by the plaintiff4 For 
practical purposes the merit of the counterclaim is the only 
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genuine issue in the la.,vs uitr The trial court sitting with(}Ut 
a jury took evidence on the complaint and counterclaim. 
On plaintiff's motion, judgment was entered on the com-
plaint for the gravel furnished by plaintiff, and the coun-
terclaim ¥~Tas dismissed.. This appeal followed. The parties 
will be referred to as they were in the Court below. .CiR'' 
indicates page numbers of the record on appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On January 16;1 1957~ the defendant, as prime contrac-
tor, entered into a contract with the State of Utah for the 
construction of approximately twelve miles of State road 
in Kane County.. Defendant then entered into a subcontract 
\vith the plaintiff ~~~hereby the defendant agreed to pay 
specified prices per ton for three types of gravel to he 
furnished by the plaintiff. The defendant entered upon 
pe-rfonnance of the contrat.-t during the early part of Feb-
ruary and thereafter completed the job to the satisfaction 
of and \vi thin the time allowed by the State of U tab under 
the prime contract.. By August 10, 195 7 ~ the plaintiff had 
furnished a.Il of the gravel which he had agreed to furnish 
under the terms of the subcontract w:ith the exception of 
certain gravel in stockpile. 
The prime contract was completed December llJ: 1957~ 
with the reservati on that a certain quantity of gr.a vel would 
later be stockpiled ( R. 113) . 0 n December 4, 1957, plain-
tiff a.nd defendant modified the subcontract to provide terms 
for the furnishing by the defendant of certain gravel iri 
stock pile (Exhibit 7) ~ Except as amended, the original 
subcontract renJained in full force and effect. There was 
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nothing in the amendment of December 4 to indicate that 
defendant \vas then claiming damages against plaintiff. 
There was a delay in the completion of the stockpiling under 
the amended subcontract and on December 21 (Exhibit 8) 
defendant terminated the subcontract and took over under 
Section 3 thereof which provided that ''should contractor 
have to assume charge on account of delay by ~ubcontractor~ 
the expense accrued therein ,~,:rill be deducted from the 
contract price'' (Exhibit 1). The "expense accrued" (being 
the additional cost of obtaining gravel for. stockpiling from 
other sources) was charged against the contract price.. 'fhe 
trial court took this into account in determining the amount 
due for gravel furnished by the plaintiff (See Exhibit 3). 
Defendant's counterclaim is predicated upon a theory 
that he is entitled to damages for delay incurred prior to 
the amendme11t of the: contract. The plaintiff denies that 
there wa.s any delay chargea-ble to him and alleges that the 
purported counterclaim is b a.rred by the provisions. of the 
subcontract and by defendant's failure to con1ply with it. 
The defendant commenced the first \Vork on the job 
during the early part of Jl,ebruary, 1957r Certain grading 
was required before gravel could be used. Gravel crushing 
operations commenced 1\1arch 4. The defendant \Vas to 
pick up the gravel at the site of the crushing plant (Exhibit 
1). Although there \Vas no provision in the contract as to 
\Vhen plaintiff's operation \\'"a.5 to begin~ defendant suggests 
that plaintiff should ·have been on the job sooner. Under 
the provisions of the prime contract, all gravel had to be 
weighed before it was placed in the road (Exhibit 1 0, Sheet 
5), and the subcontract required the defendant to furnish 
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scales for weighing same. The defendant did not furnish 
the scales until sometime between February 25 and March 
4 and thus if there V\;ras a delay it could not have been ma-
teriaL There was no obligation on the part of plaintiff to 
stockpile the gravel, and until the scales arrived, the opera-
tion intended by the parties could not be carried out. Gravel 
crushing operations began about the time the defendant 
furnished the scales to 'veigh the graveL 
In an attempt to prove delayt the defendant introduced 
a bar graph showing the timetable of operations on the job 
(Exhibit 11) . It was contended by defendant that plain-
tiff had failed to comply with the time schedule set forth 
on the bat' graph (R. 22).. This time schedule was prepared 
by the defendant .. Although it is not adnritted tha.t the time 
schedule set forth in the bar graph was in any way binding 
on the plaintiff t it is significant to note that the furnishing 
of gravel was actually ahead of the defendantts estimate 
as to the length of tim-e it would take to produce the same. 
The bar gt~aph indicated 140 working days to furnish the 
coarse gravel and said gravel was furnished in consider-
ably less time (R .. 102). The graph indicated 130 days to 
furnish the type ~'B' ~ gravel and 99% was furnished vrithin 
said time (R. 103). The other 1% was represented by 
stockpile at a site known as the Blue Pool Bridge. The ne. 
cember 4 amendment to the eontract cGvered an uncom-
pleted portion of gravel to. be stockpiled under the subcon-
tr~t and gravel for stockpiling in addition to that specified 
in the sub contract. 
The su be on tract required plain tiff to furnish coarse 
gravel at $ .. 38 per ton ; type ~ ~B t,. gravel at $.38 per tont and 
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type 1 'A~, gravel at $1.75 per ton (Exhibit 1). Defendant was 
paid by the State of Utah for the same materials at the 
rate of $.72 per ton for the coarse; $.75 per ton for the 
type ~~B~'~ and $2.00 per ton for the type '~A'' (Exhibit 10) 4 
Although defendant was paid by the State for all of the 
gravel furnished by plaintiff~ he refused to pay plaintiff 
for gravel furnished after June, 19 57.. The con tract pro-
vided that progress payments "~ould be made upon the basis 
of the engineers~ reports (Exhibit P-1) .. Plaintiff produced 
gravel during a11 of the summer months with no payment 
'vhatever for the materials fu rni shed4 In this regard the 
trial court found: 
~~The defendant paid a part of the agreed pur-
chase price of said gravel but failed and refused to 
pay the plaintiff for the gravel furnished for the 
months of July~ August1 September and October 
and for part of the gravel furnished during the 
month of December, aU in the year 1957. The sub-
contract required the defendant to make progress 
payments to the plaintiff for gravel furnished dur-
ing each of said months and the defendant failed 
and refused to do son (R .. 162, 163). 
Defendant claims that he had ~en and equipment on 
stand-by during the rn onths of July to October ( R. 12-15) 
and that plaintiff should be charged 'vith the wages of de-
fendanes employees and the rental value of his equipment 
because of an alleged delay on the part of plaintiff in fur-
nishing the gravel. It is admitted that no notice of such 
c) aim was given to the plaintiff until long after it is claimed 
to have accrued.. The Dece1nber amendment to the subcon-
tract was after virtual completion of the road and provided 
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additional ;,v or k for the plain tiff in stockpiling~ There 'tV as 
no recital in the amendment of any alleged claim. 
f"rhe defendant's counterclaim "\iYTas disclosed for the 
first time \Vhcn this suit \Vas brought .. The trial court held 
that the measure of damages and rem-edy for delay speci-
fied in the subcontract \Vas conclusive on the defendant. 
S i nee defendant had already been credited \Vith the measure 
of damages specified therein, there ~ras no further issue 
on the ccunterclaiTn. The trial court furt-her held that de-
fcndant~s failure to give notice of his alleged claim pursuant 
to the provisions of the s ubcon tr&t barr-ed the claim and 
that the defendant ~ra s not entitled to prosecute the same. 
STATE):lE)JT OF POINTS RET .. IED ON 
POINT I. 
~THE COl.~RT DID NOT ERR IN DIST\fiSSING 
'l'HE COUNTERCLATIVL 
A. Sections 3 and 5 (k) of the subcontract bar 
the defendant~s claim for damages. 
B. The defendant's counterclaim is barred by 
reason of his failure to comply with the re-
quirements of Section 5 (1) of the subcon-
tract4 
C. Defendant 1 s failure to make progress pay-
Inents excused any delay in performance o£ 
the subcontract. 
D. 'rhe defendant has. waived any right he might 
have had to recover damages for delay4 
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POIKT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN AWARDING 
Jl!DGMENT ON THE CO~iPLAINT. 
1\RGUIVIENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR II\' DISIVIISSING 
THE COUNTERCLAIM. 
A. Sections 3 and 5 (k} of the subcontract bar 
the defendant's claim for damages. 
Sections 3 and 5 of the subcontract so far as material 
here provide as follo\vs: 
~"'Section 3 ~ The Subcontractor agTee.s to com-
plete the several portions and the whole of the \Vork 
herein s ublct by the time or times f o llo\ving ~ (II ere 
insert the date or dates and if there be liquid-ated 
damages state them.) 
HD-clivery of materials to keep up as di-
rected, behind grading equipment at all times~ 
Should Contracto't ha.ve to a.ssume chwrge on 
account of dela-y by Sub con tra~tor ~ the expense 
acerucd therein 'will be deducted /1-o1n the co-n-
tTatt price. Contractor to receive gravel at site 
of crushing plant in the bin. 
~~section 5. The Contractor and Subcontractor 
agree to be bound * * * by the folio\i\ring pro-
visions: * * * The Contractor agrees- * * * 
(k) To make no demand for liquidated damages or 
penalty for delay in any sum in excess of such 
amount as may be specifically named in the Sub-
contract .. ') 
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It is important to note that Section 3 of the subcontract is 
a specific section dealing "dth the time for performance 
and prescribing a remedy and measure of damages for 
delay. The legal effect of this provision is to make any 
delay on the part of the subcontractor a material breaeh 
of thee contract which gives the contractor the remedy of 
terminating the contr~lct and charging the entire cost of 
completion against the contract price. This is a reasonable 
and effective remedy. The issue before the District Co-urt 
and before this Court on appeal is not what the measure of 
damages for delay would be in the absence of this provision. 
The question here is whether or not the remedy or measure 
of damages prescribed by this section of the contract is 
exclusive. We submit that the trial court did not err in 
determining that it is. 
It appears to be a majority rule of law that where the 
parties to a contract pres~ribe a remedy for breach the 
remedy so prescribed is exclusive. The general rule is stated 
in 12 Am. Jur. 1042 as follows: 
~,:* * * I_W]hen parties stipulate in a con .. 
tract "\Vhat the co nseq uen ces of a breach of the agree-
men t shall be~ such stipulation if reas.ona b1e is con-
trol1ing and excludes other consequences~ Where a 
contract prescribes a remedy for a breach~ that 
remedy is generaHy exclusive/' 
This is a1so true where a rule or measure of damages is 
referred to in the contract. The rule is expressed thus in 
15 Am. Jur~ 448. 
{~§49. Agreements as to d.amages.~Where par--
ties agree upon a ru1e of damages t() be followed in 
ease of a breach, no other or different rule wi1l be 
enforce<t ~' 
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There is no ru1e of law which prevents parties to a 
contract from stipulating £or a particular remedy or mea-
sure of damages to apply on default and where there is such 
a stipulationJ: it has been interpreted by the co-urts to be 
exclusive~ A case applying this principle of law is Rubin 
Vr Crow'-ey~ Milner & Compa.nyt 214 Mich. 365~ 183 N. W .. 
51. In the Rubin case plaintiff brought suit for the purchase 
price of 18 coats sold to the defendant. The defendant 
sought to offset the amount of its damages caused by an 
aUeged nonconformity of the coats with samples submitted 
before the Hale .... .:\.mong the provisions of the contract vtras 
the follo,ving: 
"~All goods in excess of purchase or different 
from samples or spe-cifications~ returnable at ship-
per" H expense.'' 
The de-fendant contended that the language of the contract 
simply gave him the right to return the goods but did not 
provide an exclusive remedy for breach of contract, and 
that it could elect to retain the coats and sue for its dam .. 
ages. The court held that the remedy provided by the con-
tract \vas exclusive. In construing the agreement,. the court 
said~ 
~ ~ [ T] he instant case is one where an express 
contract exists, where the parties have by express 
agreement prQvided for the contingency \\,..hich arose 
and agreed upon the measure of their liability~ Under 
such circumstances \Ve do not feel called upon to 
determine what the rights of the parties would be 
in case there was no contract, * * * ~jl 
In Edwards v. Perdue, 177 Ark. 241 .. 6 S. \~l. 2d 20~ the 
plaintiff sold a lease to the defendant under a contract pro-
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viding for the payment of the purchase priee in installments. 
The I ease \\T as put in escrow 'vi th instructions to the escrow 
agent that in the default of the payment of the purchase 
price the lease ~;ras to be returned lo the seller after \Vhich 
no obligation should remain. Plaintiff brought suit for 
recovery of the balance of the purchase price and the de-
fendant eontend ed by Vt-~ay of defense that the return of 
the lease \va~ the sole remedy. The trial court allowed re-
covery of the balance of the purchase price and the Supreme 
Court reversed. The rationale of the court is expressed iu 
the foil u\vi ng l a.ngua.gu : 
'~It is a settled princip1 e of law that~ when the 
parties themgelves in a. contract provide the remedy 
h1 case of default by either party, the remedy- so 
provided h~ conclusive.." 
Similarly, in B ottemiller v r Ball~ 13 0 Ore~ 255, 279 Pac. 542~ 
the buyer under a \Vl'itten land purchase contract agreed 
that the sel1 er should be entitled to a surren dcr of the land 
upon default in the performance o:f the con tract by the 
buyer. The court "\Vas called upon to determine whether or 
not upon the buyer's default the seller had any remedy other 
than to recover the property. The court said ~ 
~",Vhen the parties prepared their contract they 
evidently anticipated such a situation as now con .. 
fronts them and made provision as to ho"\v the con-
troversy shou1d be disposed of; that is, the defen-
dant should 'H-urtender and deliver up the said prop-
erty and premises to the· seller~~ They arc agreed 
that this court has hold that 'vhen a contract pr& 
scribes a ren1edy for a. breach, that remedy is gen-
erally exclusive and will be enforced. The following 
adj u die. a tions justify their conclusions. ( Citing 
Cases.) 1 ' 
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In Buffalo Pitts Company v4 Alderdice, (Texas), 177 
S~ \\:' ~ 1044, the rule was expressed as follo1vs: 
'' * * * It has uniformly been ruled that~ 
\Vhen the parties to a contract agree upon the reme-
dies that shall accrue in case of breach thereof, such 
agreed re·med i es are ex:cl usi ve of all others.'' 
In McCready v. LindenbCYrn, 172 N. Y .. 400, 65 N. E. 208~ 
the Supreme Court of }~ e~~ York said: 
~ t * * * \Vhen the parties by their contract 
provide for the consequences of a breach~ lay do\Vll 
a rule to admeasu1~e the damages~ and agree when 
they are to be paid 7 the remedy thus provided must 
be exclusively followed.' 1 
In Ancrum v. Camden H>"ater, Li_qht & Ice Company, 82 S4 
C~ 284J 64 S. E. 151, the rule was stated thus; 
~'v"\1len parties themselves stipulate in the con-
traL1 ~·hat shal1 be the cons-equences of a breach of 
the agreement, Huch stipulation if reaHonable, is con-
tro llingt and excludes other consequences. (Citing 
Cases.)" 
We submit that even disregarding Section 5 (k) of the 
contract the legal e.f feet of prescribing a remedy for delay 
in Section 3 wa.s to render Haid remedy exclusive. Regard-
less of the .above rule of law, however, it is clear ffom a 
reading of the .subcontract that it was the intent uf the 
parties that the remedy and measure provided be exclusive. 
Assrnne the rule to be that the court must construe the 
entire contract to determine whether or not the remedy 
prescribed for de 1ay \Vas intended by the parties to be ex-
elusive. The same result must :follo,v. Section 3 was clearly 
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intended by the parties to prescribe the time for perform-
ance and the penalty or remedy fGr delay. The parties c0:n ... 
templated that the contractor (defendant) would ''assume 
charge" in the event of delay ·and deduct ~~he expense ac .. 
crued therein'' from the contract price .. By paragraph 5 (k) 
the contractor agrees '"'to make no demand for penalty for 
delay in any sum in excess of such amount as may be specifi-
cally named in the subcontract.'" The ~~penalty for dela.y'' 
prescribed by Section 3 is the sum expended by the contrcw. 
tor in completing the job afte1 .. he has assum..ed charge on 
account of delay. (In some cases this could equal or exceed 
the contract price.) Thus, the very language of the contract 
itself makes the penalty or remedy for delay prescribed in 
Section 3 exclusive. A different construction would certainly 
defeat the obvious intent of the parties. The parties did 
not intend another or different remedy or measure of dam-
ages~ 
The most c-o ncl us i ve a.n.swer in thls. caset however, is 
the fact that the contractor did "assume charge on account 
of delay'' and the expense accrued therein \Vas charged 
against the contract price. He did avail himself of the pre-
scribed remedy. The evidence is clear as stated by appellant 
in his brief that the defendant did take over performance 
of the con tract as. modified· and it is. agreed that the entire 
expense accrued therein was charged against the contra.ct 
price. When defendant took over after te-nninating on 
December 21~ he indicated in his letter of termination that 
the measure of damages would be to \Vithhold the cost of 
completion from amounts due plaintiff (Exhibit 8). This 
should be the end of the c.ounterclaim4 
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The defendant, having availed hlmse1f of the remedy 
prescribed in the contract,. now seeks to recover under an 
entirely separate remedy and measure of damages. Defen-
dant says that he had men and equipment on stand-by dur· 
ing the months of July through August; that the wages 
and rental value thereof (amounting to a figure of approxi-
mately $53~000) is chargeable to the plaintiff; that he could 
continue to incur a ~ounterclaim against defendant on the 
theory of delay~ and that 'vhen this imaginative amount 
had been incuned, he could then step in, complete· the con-
tract, charge the entire cost of completion to the plaintiff* 
and then recover the full amount of all of his claimed dam-
ages for the period he had not pursued the remedy pre-
scribed in the contract .. \Ve submit that the court properly 
interpreted Sections 3 and 5 to limit the defend ant's re-
covery to the amount expend-ed in completing the contract 
and to preclude the fantastic counterclaim. 
The cases cited in defendant's brief in support of the 
argument that the prescribed remedy is not exclusive do 
not involve contracts prescribing a remedy for a specific 
breach nor a provision (such as Section 5 (k)) expressly 
limiting the contractor's remedy to that prescribed by the 
pa.rties4 The general prin cip1 es of Ia v...- urged by defendant 
have no applicatio-n whatever to the facts of thls case where 
the court must construe the con tract of the parties .. 
B.. The defendant's counterclaim is barred by 
rea.son of his failure to comply \vith the re-
quirements of Section 5 (1) of the subron .. 
tract .. 
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Section 5 (1) of the subcontr.act reads as follows: 
~~The Contractor agrees--(1) That no· claim for 
services rendered Dr materials furnished by the Con-
tractor to the subcontractor shall be valid unl-ess 
\Vritten notice thereof is given by the Contractor 
to the Subcontractor during the first ten days of the 
cal e:n dar month :foil owing that in which the- claim 
originated~ n 
Defendant's counterclaim is composed of employee~s wages 
and the alleged rental value of equipment (See Rr 22) . (De~ 
fendant \Vas allovved the item for gravel procured from 
other sources.) )I o notice of claim covering these charges 
was given to the subcontractor (See Supp1emental Record)~ 
This is not a case involving claims for delay consisting of 
penalties imposed upon the contractor by the owner or 
general al1egations of loss of pfofitsr The contractor seeks 
here to charge men and equipment to the subcontraetor. 
The question is 'vhether o-r not the contractor under the 
provisions of his .contract may allow such expense to accrue 
v?i thout notice to the subcontractor and still have a right 
to recover the alleged items of expense. \Ve think that 
Section ,-; ( 1) \Vas. drafted to avoid this very res u It. 
The obvious purport of Section 5 (I) was to pr{)vide 
the subcontractor '\oVith notice of his standing with, and 
obligation to the contractor. If the contractor was to charge 
the subc~ntractor 'With the \Vages of employees or rental 
value of equipment, the subcontractor was entitled to notice 
as prescribed by the contract and in the absence thereof 
no such claim is HvaUd. ~J 
In urging that the trial court erred in interpreting 
Section 5 (l), the defendant cites a single case which con-
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strues the \vords ustockyard services'' as used in a statute. 
Obviously, the judicial interpretation of the words ~~stock­
yard servicesn could have no application to the facts of this 
case. Contrary to the defendant~s tortuous construction to 
require something Hu sefuPt ( ~"hatev er that means) ~ the 
purpose of the provision in which this word '~services~' is 
used is to give notice of the charge to the subcontractor. It 
gives hi:tn a right to know of these charges as they accrue 
so that he may knoy~r of his standing "\vith the contractor 
and do \~.rhat is necessary to avoid such future charges. If 
he is to be charged, it is of no concern to him whether the 
service is chat~ acterized: as useful or n ot4 I-I is in tcrest is in 
the purported charge- and an itemization thereof and not 
an analysis of the eharaeter of it. It makes no difference 
\vhether the m€n and equipment \vere actually 'vorking in 
what. the: con tractor characterizes a ~~use-ful endeavor~' so 
long aB the charge \\'"as tn be made to the plaintiff. Section 
5 ( l) gave him a right to knu\v of the claimr If the charges 
for alleged rental value and Vitage expense are for Hservices'' 
within the meaning of Section 5 (1) as eon.st·ru,ed 'ht light of 
the purpose of the pro ·vision in tv hick they are f ottnd, the 
defendanes failure to give notice bars his claim~ The issue 
is just that simp1e. 
The legal definitio-n commonly given for the ·wnrd. Hser-
vices~J is expressed in 79 C. J4 S. 1143~ as follows: 
HServices.. * * * In the- plural the term in-
volves more than mere 1aborl' and signifies much 
more than merely the act of performing labor and 
may include as well expenditurest tnl:iterials and 
things furnished .. Jf 
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In the case of Levitt v. Fabe'f'", et al.~ 64 P .. 2d 498,: the Cali-
fornia court distinguished between the terms {~services't and 
"~personal .services .. l' t In so doing,. the court said : 
"· 'Services" and 'personal services t are not def-
initely co-extensive. * * * 'Services' may be 
rendered though the actual labor be performed by 
one's emp~oyees and by mea.ns of his machinery or 
other equipment, but "personal servicesl' are those 
performed by the individual himself.'' (Emphasis 
supplied.) 
Thus services includes not only manpower but machinery 
and equipment. See also People v. McCord~ 59 P ~ 2d 587t in-
terpreting the language '~services or materials1 ) to include 
a charge for transportati~n. 
Considering the purpose o£ the text wher-e it is foundJ 
the language '~claim fo.r services rendered"' includes the 
wages of employees and the rental value of equipment which 
the defendant seeks by his counterclaim to charge to the 
plaintiff. The whole purpose of Section 5 (1) is to give 
notice to the subcontractor of any such claim and an inter-
pretation which 'vould allow the contractor to charge such 
items to the subcontractor and recover the same without 
notice frustrates the plain 1anguage and intent of the writ-
ten instrument. The court did not err in holding that the 
counterclaim 'vas barred for defendant~s failure to comply 
¥lith Section 5 (1). 
C. Defendant~s failure to make progress pay-
ments excused any delay in performance of 
the subcontract 
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The plaintiff is suing for gravel furnished after June 
30~ 1957. Defendant claims that he had men and equip-
ment on stand-by during that period. During the same per-
iod the defendant failed and refused to make progTess pay-
ments for the gravel furnished by the plaintiff. The failure 
to make progress payment-S was a material breach of the 
subcontract which would not only have j u~tified the plain-
tiff~s termination of the contract had he chosen to do so, 
but under the eire umstance s constituted a 1 egal excuse for 
any delay.. In Guerini Stone Company V~ CarUn Co11Struc-
tion Company, 248 U~ S .. 334, 345, the United States Supreme 
Court said: 
H* * $ In a building or construction con-
tract like the one in question, calling for the per-
formance o.f labor and furnishing of materials. * * * 
a stipulation for payments on account to be made 
from. time to time during the pro-gress of the vror k 
must be deemed so material that a substantial fail-
ure wou 1d justify the con tractor in declining to pro-
ceed.'" 
The general rule of law to the· same effect is set forth in 17 
C. J. S .. 981. If such a failure on the part of the con~ 
tractor would excuse further performance on the part of 
the subcontractor, certain1y it would excuse delay in per-
formance.. The contractor should not be heard to complain 
of delay at the same time he is withholding payments due 
the subcontractor under the provisions of the contract. The 
defendant is not entitled to insist upon a strict compliance 
with the time provisions of the -contract when he himself 
has failed to do his part on time or at all.. 'Ve submit that 
the defend-ant's failure to comply in this respect is a bar 
to his counterclaim. 
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D.. The defendant ·has waived any right he might 
have had to rec-over dam.a.ges for delay. 
A party entitled to dan1ages may lose his right to re-
cover the same by wai vcr ~ Sherer v. City of LagunGt BeafJhJ 
(Cal.~ 1 936), 57 P .. 2d 157. In this case the defendant ciaims 
to have built up a very substantial claim for damages by 
reason of alleged breach of the subcontract. Not only did 
th c defendant fall to notify the plain tiff of the accrual of 
gaid clain1, but after all alleged items thereof had been in-
curred~ the subcontract "\vas amended and the subcontractor 
was directed to go on \vith his work in furnishing gravel. 
The defendant ""~as pro bah ly appreh en si ve that had he made 
a proper (!la.im at that time for the fantastic amounts he 
nov1 seeks to recover plaintiff "vould not have been ''illing 
to suppleme-nt the subcontract and· to continue perform.ance 
th er ~unde-r. \l..] hatever the exp1anationt the supplement con-
tained no reference 0-r reservation of the defendant's pur-
ported claim. Eve-n ~rhen the defendant terminated the sub-
contract on D-ecember 21t 1 957, the only indication of any 
claim for damages ~vas that defendant "vould 1vithhold the 
expense of furnishing the unexecuted portions of the sub-
contract ("Exhibit 8). This 'vas done. Vle submit that in 
allowing the defendant to- perform under the contract and 
under the supplement thereto over a period of approximately 
six n1onths \vithout notice of the purported claim ,vhich he 
contends ,~~as accruing and in amending the contract and 
terminating it 'vithout reference to the items set forth in 
the counterclaim~ the defendant has effectively \V ai ved the 
claim for damages and should not be allowed to assert the 
same. 
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POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN A WARDING 
JUDGMENT ON THE COMPLAINT. 
Defendant contends that the plaintiff did not substan-
tially perform the subcontract. ~fhe evidence conclusively 
shows that he did. The subcontract and! the amendment 
thereto called for plaintiff to furnish three different types 
of gravel the aggregate quantity of which was 182~510 tons 
(Exhibits P-1 and 4). The plaintiff actually furnished 
187,919.85 tons (Exhibit P~2) ~ or approximately 5,.400 tons 
in addition to the tonnage specified in the contract. It is 
true that the job required gravel in excess of that specified 
in the contract but the total of all gravel purchased by the 
defendant from outside sources was only 4~287 tons (Ex-
hibit 3). In accordance with the agreement o.f the parties, 
the cost of this gravel was deducted from the contract price 
due plaintiff. Under the con tract (Sections 2, 3 and 4) 
plaintiff \Va.s entitled to the contract price less this deduc-
tion. The eventuality that defendant might take over and 
expend monies in comp1eti on v..~ as specifically provided for 
and it is clear that the contract was so dravm. as to allo'"'~ 
recovery for gravel furnished by the plaintiff regardless 
of delay. 
On the issue of delay the evidence compels a finding 
that the plaintiff substantially performed under the time 
requirements of the contract. As already pointed out, the 
gravel for the road~bed w-as actually furnished in less time 
than the defendant himself prescribed in the time schedule 
(See page 4~ supra) . The defendant actually finished his 
con tract with the State ahead of schedule.. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
20 
In a.ny event it could hardly be contended \Vith any 
semblence of reason that the plaintiff is not entitled to be 
compensated for the gravel furnished to the defendant 
The defendant was compensated by the State for every ton 
of gravel furnished by the- plaintiff~ Even ignoring the 
contra-ct \vhich, in the event of delay, directs the payment 
of the contract price less defendant~s cost of acquiring 
other gravel, quantum meruit would bring more than the 
contract price judging from the price whlch defendant paid 
for the additional gravel (Exhibits 3 and 7) and the price 
he obtained from the State ("Rxhibit P -1) . The value to 
him of the gra.vel furnished by the p 1 aintiff far exceeded 
the cost \Vhlch plaintiff wag allo,ved to recover. ~7e submit 
that the judgment on the complaint should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
'Ve subrrrit that a reasonable and fair construction of 
- the subcontract precludes the defendant from recovery of 
the alleged items of damage specified in the counterclaim. 
The defendant's own flagrant refusal to meet the time re-
quirements regarding progress payments and to give notice 
of the purported claim as it accrued is also a complete de-
fens e to the counterclaim. The court did not err in alloiDng 
the plaintiff the agreed cost of the gravel furnished less 
the added cost to defendant of procuring additional gravel. 
''r e submit that the judgment of the tria 1 court should be 
affirmed. 
Respectful1y su bnri ttedt 
GRANT MACFARLA-NE, 
GRANT MA·CFARLANEt JR., 
A tto1~1-eys for Pl.aintiff 
and Respondent. 
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